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Russian Federation: Executive Branch  
By Susan Cavan 
 
PRESIDENCY 
Litvinenko's words reverberate 
The death in London of former KGB/FSB officer Aleksandr Litvinenko, apparently 
murdered by exposure to Polonium-210, has focused attention on both the 
activities of Russia's security services and the administration of President 
Vladimir Putin.  
 
The radioactive murder weapon suggests that a controversial, public and 
lingering death were anticipated and thus, the list of suspects and motives is 
focused on political enemies and former security services colleagues.  In the 
letter he dictated from his deathbed, however, Litvinenko clearly and colorfully 
accuses President Putin: "You may succeed in silencing one man but the howl of 
protest from around the world will reverberate, Mr. Putin, in your ears for the rest 
of your life." (1)  
 
While international media outlets investigate the details of Litvinenko's death, 
from the transportation route of the Polonium, to Litvinenko's mysterious 
luncheon companion prior to the onset of the effects of the poisoning, Russian 
media play down the incident and focus attention on an alternate suspect, 
another Russian exile in London, Boris Berezovsky.  
 
Nonetheless, President Putin was forced to respond to Litvinenko's posthumous 
denunciation, choosing an odd brush-off.  In addition to rebuking those who 
turned "tragic events like death" into "political provocation," Putin questioned the 
nature of Litvinenko's death, "British doctors did not indicate…that it was a violent 
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death."  (2)  Lest his other attempts to divert the conversation from Kremlin or 
GRU or SVR , etc. involvement fail, Putin raised doubts about the authenticity of 
Litvinenko's deathbed letter, accusing the victim's friends of concocting the note. 
(3)  
 
Unfortunately for Putin, the headline-grabbing use of radiation in this 
assassination will ensure the survival of the story, at the very least.  (Please see 
Security Services below for a more detailed discussion of the Aleksandr 
Litvinenko case.) 
 
Gaidar illness suspicious? 
As if the poisoning of a former KGB officer  wasn't enough, former Russian Prime 
Minister, Yegor Timurovich Gaidar fell ill during a conference in Ireland, and 
doctors suspect he may have been poisoned, as well.  
 
Gaidar, who became quite seriously ill while speaking at a conference entitled 
"Collective Memory: Russia and Ireland" at the National University of Ireland at 
Maynooth, was admitted to hospital in Dublin, but discharged himself and headed 
back to Russia.  His treatment apparently continues in a clinic near Moscow. (4) 
 
Gaidar's illness, and his odd decision to fly back to Moscow while apparently still 
suffering the effects of whatever afflicted him, is a contrary indicator for those 
who formed a link from Litvinenko's assassination to Gaidar's possible poisoning.  
If Gaidar was made ill deliberately (and the Irish hospital where he was initially 
admitted has no evidence of toxin or other radiation, but is fuelling speculation), 
then why would he leave hospital in the West for a clinic in Russia? (5)  Was he 
more at risk abroad than in Moscow, and if so, what does that say about the 
possible responsible parties? 
 
While numerous reports have listed Gaidar as a "critic" of the Russian president, 
he has done little to justify that moniker and remains better described as an 
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economist and politician whose ideas, at times, conflict with those of the current 
regime.  His connection to Litvinenko is yet more tenuous and thus presents a 
better case that the incidents were separate acts. 
 
Anatoli Chubais, perhaps the ultimate Kremlin insider, was quick to link the 
Gaidar's mysterious illness to murder: "It seems fairly clear, at least to me, that 
the deadly sequence involving Politkovskaya, Litvinenko, and Gaidar - which 
failed to work out as planned - would have played into the hands of those who 
seek to pursue unconstitutional means of regime change in Russia." (6) 
 
Again, more questions than answers present themselves:  Are these forces, 
which seek unconstitutional regime change in Russia, working in opposition to 
the Putin Kremlin or with them?  Is Chubais setting up an argument that 
highlights the strength of ugly, anti-western forces, then posits a strong Putin 
third term to counteract the more malevolent forces boiling beneath the surface?  
(This argument has been trotted out in the run up to nearly every election 
campaign in the post-Soviet era, most notably in the 1996 election, where 
Chubais himself announced he had stopped a coup that would have halted the 
onward march of democracy and elections.) (7) 
 
The murder of Aleksandr Litvinenko and illness of Yegor Gaidar are unlikely to be 
resolved to anyone's true satisfaction—both the shock of the episodes, as well as 
the conspiracy theories surrounding each, have contributed to the creation of a 
well of suspicion about the activity of Russia's security services, the motives of 
Kremlin apparatchiki and President Putin, as well as the safety of Russia's fissile 
material.  
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) Full text of former spy's posthumous letter, Agence France Presse, 24 Nov 06 
12:17 GMT via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
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(2) "Ex-spy's death should not be used for provocation," RIA-Novosti, 24 Nov 06 
via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) "Russian ex-premier's acute illness investigated," by Kim Murphy, 1 Dec 06, 
Los Angeles Times via Lexis-Nexis Academic Search. 
(5) Doctors insist Russian politician was poisoned but find no toxic substance, 
Associated Press, 5 Dec 06, 9:12 GMT via Lexis-Nexis Academic Search. 
(6) Gaidar: Dragged into Political Context," by Anton Trofimov and Svetlana 
Gomzikova, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 30 Nov 06; What the Papers Say (WPS) via 
Lexis-Nexis Academic Search.   
(7) Chubais Press Conference on dismissals,20 Jun 96, Moscow Russian Public 
Television First Channel Network in Russian 0930 GMT 20 Jun 96, (FBIS-SOV-
96-121, 21 June 1996, pp. 33-7) via the ISCIP database. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Robyn Angley 
 
NGO re-registration 
Last year, the Duma passed a law mandating the re-registration of 
noncommercial organizations (also known as non-governmental organizations or 
NGOs). There was widespread concern that this law would have a restrictive 
effect on foreign-funded NGOs operating within Russia. However, despite the 
largely Western reactions against the forced registration, the deadline of 18 
October 2006 has come and gone with relatively few foreign or foreign-funded 
NGOs being denied the right to re-register. 
 
The opening volley for control over NGOs took place in July when, after an 
extensive audit, the Center for the Promotion of International Defense received a 
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bill from the government for 4.6 millions rubles (approximately $175,000 at the 
current exchange rate) in back taxes. (1)  The Center is headed by Karina 
Moskalenko, a prominent lawyer who in 2000 was awarded a medal for “For 
Defending Human Rights” by then human rights ombudsman Oleg Mironov. The 
Center has received several grants for the defense of human rights from the 
John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, including a three-year grant in 
2004 for $180,000. The purpose of the program supported by this grant was to 
train human rights lawyers. One of the goals of the program was to “ensure 
better selection and preparation of cases to be brought to the European Court.” 
(2) 
 
It is perhaps the Center’s activity in bringing cases to the European Court, 
coupled with Karina Moskalenko’s role as lawyer to imprisoned oligarch Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky, which has brought the organization under the increased scrutiny 
of the state. Moskalenko was instrumental in submitting a case filed by 
Khodorkovsky to the European Court of Human Rights. Additionally, her scathing 
indictments of the Russian legal system, especially when the Prosecutor 
General’s office threatened to revoke Khodorkovsky’s lawyers’ rights to practice 
law, (3) have undoubtedly done little to endear her or her organization to the 
Kremlin. 
 
Following the delivery of the hefty tax bill to the Center for the Promotion of 
International Defense, the NGO re-registration process was off to a slow start. As 
of 19 September, a month before the 18 October re-registration deadline, only 26 
foreign NGOs had re-registered out of several hundred. (4) 
 
The cumbersome process of re-registration was the source of considerable 
complaint from the affected NGOs. Re-registration involved the presentation of 
several sets of documents (some of them difficult to obtain), which ranged from 
the laws according to which the NGO had been established as a non-profit in its 
home country, to information about the NGO’s founders, to documentation of the 
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decision of the original NGO to create a branch in Russia. The documents had to 
be submitted in Russian and in the language of the NGO’s home country. (5) 
 
Just five days before the deadline, on 13 October, a Nizhnii Novgorod court 
announced its ruling to shut down the Russian-Chechen Friendship Society on 
the basis of anti-extremist legislation. The Russian-Chechen Friendship Society 
has worked extensively on cases of human rights abuse in Chechnya, including 
through the publication of information about abuses in Chechnya and the North 
Caucasus in its newspaper “Rights Defense.” It also refers human rights abuse 
cases in Chechnya to the United Nations. 
 
The basis of the ruling to close down the NGO was that its leader, Stanislav 
Dmitrievsky, was convicted in February 2006 on charges of extremism. Russian 
anti-extremist legislation dictates that organizations whose leaders have been 
convicted of extremism can be shut down. Dmitrievsky was charged because he 
published a statement by Akhmed Zakayev as well as Aslan Maskhadov’s appeal 
to the European Parliament in 2005. The Russian-Chechen Friendship Society 
has two months in which to appeal the decision. The organization intends to try 
to take the case to the Russian Supreme Court. 
 
Although the decision to close the Russian-Chechen Friendship Society hardly 
boded well for NGOs, the re-registration process actually proceeded with 
surprisingly few hiccups. Several organizations had to resubmit their paperwork 
because of errors in documentation—the majority of which were characterized by 
Justice Ministry representative Natalia Veshnyakova as grammar problems or 
typos (6)—most Western organizations have been able to re-register 
successfully. Among them are Amnesty International, Doctors without Borders, 
the National Democratic Institute, and the Danish Refugee Council. 
 
Source Notes: 
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(1) “Non-commercial profits,” Vedemosti, 25 Jul 06; WPS via Lexis-Nexis.  
(2) MacArthur Foundation Website, http://www.macfound.org/site/c. 
lkLXJ8MQKrH/b.1145509/apps/nl/conte nt3.asp?content_id=%7B884104C2-
9D5C-4F75-9564-831B76AA8EF1%7D&notoc=1. Accessed 3 Dec 06.  
(3) “Legal expert outraged at Khodorkovsky’s foreign lawyer expulsion,” Ekho 
Moskvy, 23 Sep 05; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis.  
(4) “Russian watchdog, foreign NGOs trade accusations as registration deadline 
looms,” Ekho Moskvy, 19 Sep 06; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(5) “Foreign NGOs required to re-register,” Kommersant, 20 Sep 06; Current 
Digest of the Post-Soviet Press via Lexis-Nexis. “Only three organizations have 
been denied registration,” Kommersant-Vlast, 30 Oct 06; What the Papers via 
Lexis-Nexis. 
(6) “Only three organizations have been denied registration,” Kommersant-Vlast, 
30 Oct 06; What the Papers via Lexis-Nexis. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Fabian Adami 
 
Death Of A Spy: Who killed Aleksandr Litvinenko? 
Six years ago, Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandr Litvinenko—until then an FSB 
officer—defected to Britain. In the six years following his arrival, Litvinenko 
worked for Boris Berezovsky, the exiled Russian oligarch, and self-professed 
enemy of President Vladimir Putin.  
   
In 2001, with financial backing from Berezovsky, Litvinenko published a book, 
“Blowing Up Russia: Terror From Within,” in which he alleged that the FSB ran a 
highly secret "black" team, dedicated to “eliminating those deemed dangerous to 
the Russian state.” (1)  This claim, given the litany of assassinations carried out 
by Soviet or other Warsaw Pact Security Services during the Cold War (including 
the Georgi Markov case), was hardly a revelation. Yet the book contained a 
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further allegation, which, if true, implicated the Russian government at its highest 
levels in a serious crime against its own population. Specifically, Litvinenko 
alleged that the 1999 Moscow apartment bombings, apparently carried out by 
Chechens, and used as the catalyst for launching the second Chechen war, were 
carried out as an internal Provokatsia by the FSB. (2)  While this allegation is not 
new, Litvinenko, along with his sponsor, claimed to possess hard evidence 
proving Putin’s and the FSB’s guilt.   
    
On November 1, Aleksandr Litvinenko met with an Italian “contact,” Mario 
Scaramella—a “security expert”—at Itsu, a popular London Sushi restaurant. The 
purpose of the meeting apparently was to discuss Anna Politkovskaya's murder, 
which the ex-FSB officer was investigating.  Litvinenko claimed, after the fact, 
that he had been provided documents “naming” those responsible for the 
journalist’s death. (3)  Apparently, Scaramella also requested the meeting in 
order to show Litvinenko a “hit list of Kremlin targets,” that contained both of their 
names. (4)  The same day, Litvinenko also met with Andrei Lugovoi, a former 
KGB and FSB agent, now a security consultant in Moscow, as well as a third 
individual “known only as Vladimir” at the Millennium Hotel in Piccadilly. (5)  It is 
not clear which meeting took place first. Scaramella has claimed that the meeting 
with Lugovoi took place after his own discussion with Litvinenko, whilst Lugovoi 
claims the opposite. (6)  On November 3, Litvinenko was checked into Barnet 
General Hospital and after eight days, he was transferred to University College 
Hospital. (7)  Three weeks later, on the night of November 23, Litvinenko died 
with his wife and son at his bedside.  
    
Initial tests during his treatment had led to the conclusion that thallium, a highly 
toxic, “tasteless, colorless, odorless” substance (one gram of which can be fatal) 
had been ingested by Litvinenko. (8)  That diagnosis was amended within a few 
days, when authorities claimed that the thallium might have been radioactive. 
Medical opinion was revised once more when doctors discovered traces of 
Polonium 210 in Litvinenko’s urine. (9)  Litvinenko’s condition: failed internal 
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organs and failed bone marrow apparently were commensurate with a lethal 
dose of radiation.  
    
Litvinenko’s illness and subsequent death have brought forth a spate of theories 
about who was responsible.  The first, and probably most ridiculous, is that the 
CIA was responsible. According to this theory, Mario Scaramella was a 
consultant for an Italian parliamentary investigation, the “Mitrokhin Panel,” which 
was analyzing Soviet intelligence activity in Italy during the Cold War. As such, 
Scaramella allegedly was a double agent for Italian intelligence and the CIA, 
which decided to “take out” Litvinenko “when he ceased to be an asset,” while 
being assured that the blame would fall on Moscow. (10)  The second theory—
and one which seems equally ridiculous—is that Litvinenko committed suicide: 
he “so detested Putin he was willing to end his life…in a last ditch attempt to 
discredit him.” (11)  
    
The third theory—and the one being trumpeted by the Kremlin, as well as other 
press and authority figures in Moscow—is that Boris Berezovsky was responsible 
for Litvinenko’s death. According to this line of argument, Berezovsky had 
Litvinenko killed as part of an “anti-Russian PR Campaign,” (12) designed to 
tarnish President Putin’s reputation even further. Moreover, the voices claiming 
that Berezovsky masterminded Litvinenko’s death also argue that the oligarch 
was protecting himself: British and Russian Prosecutors recently signed a 
cooperation memorandum. Russian justice officials are putting forth renewed 
efforts to see Berezovsky’s extradition in relation to the Yukos affair: Berezovsky 
therefore may need to provide new “evidence” that his life would be in danger 
were he to be extradited, and “the poisoning of an ‘enemy of the FSB’ ought to 
satisfy” the judge presiding over the hearings for the moment. (13)   
    
Finally, there are allegations that Russian Security Services carried out the 
assassination. As was to be expected, Litvinenko’s friends and colleagues, as 
well as the victim himself, in his death-bed final statement, have espoused the 
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idea of a revenge assassination by the security services. (14)  Interestingly, their 
allegations have found support from Oleg Gordievsky, the most high profile Cold 
War defector to the United Kingdom. In an interview with The Daily Telegraph, 
Gordievsky stated that the assassination attempt would not have occurred 
“without the express approval of the President.” Moreover, he claimed that 
President Putin was “eliminating his opponents with the same ruthless efficiency 
displayed by Adolph Hitler in the 1930s…I know that today the KGB has tried to 
kill my friend.” (15)  At the time of writing, only one intelligence agency, the SVR 
(Foreign Intelligence) has explicitly denied any involvement. (16)  All other 
denials issued by Russian authorities have spoken merely of “Russian Special 
Services.” (17)  It should be noted, that the allegations being made are not 
against the SVR, but against the FSB. Such an operation is not beyond the 
FSB’s scope: in July of this year, the Duma passed legislation allowing the FSB 
to operate abroad in order to hunt down extremists, as well as those who 
“libelously criticize the regime.” (18)  
    
During the last few days, new evidence has emerged that indicates it may not 
have been the Security Services themselves who carried out the assassination, 
but rather a proxy.  According to the documents given to Litvinenko by 
Scaramella, the contents of which were made public only days ago, an agency 
called "Dignity and Honor" has existed for some time in Russia. Made up of ex-
Secret Servicemen, including surveillance experts and “Spetsnaz—trained 
killers,” the agency is apparently highly regarded by the President, and is viewed 
widely as an “extension of Putin’s secret services.” (19)  It is entirely possible that 
Putin delegated the assassination to this group, so as to give himself and the 
“official” agencies of state plausible deniability. 
   
That Aleksandr Litvinenko was murdered is beyond dispute. Yet there is one 
aspect of this case that has received no attention—but which may hold the key. 
According to Ekho Moskvy Radio and Moskovski Komsomolets, Litvinenko 
secretly visitedMoscow in early November, to be questioned by the FSB 
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regarding his knowledge of the Politkovskaya murder. (20)  If this is true, 
Litvinenko may have been poisoned in Moscow, and possibly with two 
substances at the same time. Indeed evidence so far may support such 
conjecture: radiation has been discovered on British Airways aircraft flying the 
Moscow route, (21) as well as at each of the locations frequented by Litvinenko 
in London, including Berezovsky’s office.  
   
Given the nature of the Litvinenko case, the true answer as to who killed the 
defector may never be known. However, it seems safe to conclude—given their 
history, that Litvinenko was killed by the Security Services or a proxy, on orders 
from the highest levels of government, because of something he knew, probably 
in regards to the murder of Anna Politkovskaya.  
 
Addendum 
On Sunday December 3, The Sunday Times (London) carried an article claiming 
that President Putin had “taken exception” to Aleksandr Litvinenko’s death-bed 
statement, and had “expressed anger” that British Authorities had not silenced 
him. (22)  Why, if Putin has nothing to fear from an investigation, did he seek to 
silence the last words of a dying man?  
    
Oleg Gordievsky’s allegations concerning Litvinenko’s death have been 
supported by Mikhail Trepashkin, a former FSB officer currently imprisoned in 
Russia. Trepashkin published a letter from prison in which he claimed that the 
FSB had set up a squad with specific instructions to kill Litvinenko in 2002. The 
FSB has refused to comment on Trepashkin’s allegations. (23) 
 
Update: Politkovskaya murder investigation 
Two months ago, Anna Politkovskaya was murdered in her Moscow apartment 
building.  In a remarkable coincidence, her death occurred on President Vladimir 
Putin’s birthday. (24)  Given Politkovskaya’s public profile, and the sensitivity of 
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the case, it was hardly surprising that the homicide investigation was taken on 
directly by the Prosecutor General’s office.  
   
On  October 26, Kommersant published a story that indicated several former 
OMON officers had carried out the killing at the instigation of Sergei Lapin, a 
former comrade, currently serving time in Chechnya on a war crimes conviction.  
    
Two weeks ago, Aleksandr Prilepin—one of Lapin’s former colleagues, and 
allegedly one of the killers—gave a brief interview to Rossiiskaya Gazeta from a 
secret location, during which he claimed that he was in hiding for fear of being 
subjected to a "show trial" at the hands of the authorities. Prilepin admitted that a 
number of ex-OMON operatives harbored anger at Politkovskaya for her reports 
on Chechnya, because her actions (along with those of other journalists) had 
provided “ideological support” for the rebels, (25) but claimed that neither he nor 
his colleagues would seek revenge after “so many years.” (26)  
    
Prilepin’s fears regarding a "show trial" likely are well-founded. In the aftermath of 
Aleksandr Litvinenko’s assassination—apparently connected to his own 
investigation into Politkovskaya’s death—the Kremlin needs a rapid resolution to 
the case even more urgently. Without a “conviction,” the authorities’ claims that 
the Politkovskaya and Litvinenko murders are not connected is built on a 
foundation of sand—whereas, if the case is "solved," any new evidence brought 
“post-mortem” by Litvinenko can simply be dismissed. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) “Chronicle Of A Murder Bid Foretold: Exiled KGB Chief Fights For Life In 
London Hospital,” The Independent, 20 Nov 06. 
(2) “How Violence Returned To Blight Moscow-On-Thames,” The Times Of 
London, 22 Nov 06. 
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(3) “Fearful Life And Dangerous Liaisons Of A Russian Agent On The Run,” The 
Sunday Times, 26 Nov 06. 
(4) “Litvinenko Was Told That He Was Marked For Death,” The Times Of 
London, 22 Nov 06.  
(5) “Litvinenko May Have Fallen Foul Of Russian Businessmen,” The Times Of 
London, 2 December 06.  
(6) “Fearful Life And Dangerous Liaisons Of A Russian Agent On The Run,” The 
Sunday Times, 26 Nov 06. 
(7) “Russia’s Secret Service Suspected Of Murder Bid,” The Independent, 20 
Nov 06.  
(8) “Poisoned Ex-Spy Slightly Worse,” BBC News, 20 Nov 06 via 
www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/6164284.stm  
(9) “Net Tightens On The Amateur Assassins,” The Daily Telegraph, 1 Dec 06.  
(10) “Litvinenko Could Have Been Poisoned By The CIA,” Mir Novostei, 24 Nov 
06; What The Papers Say via Lexis Nexis.  
(11) “Was he Sacrificed To Embarrass Putin?” The Daily Telegraph, 27 Nov 06.  
(12) “Litvinenko ‘Poisoning’ Part Of Anti-Russian PR Campaign,” Center TV, 
Moscow, 24 Nov 06; BBC Monitoring via Lexis Nexis. 
(13) “Why Berezovsky Is Fussing Around Litvinenko’s Bedside,” Izvestia, 23 Nov 
06; What The Papers Say via Lexis Nexis.  
(14) “The Bastards Got Me,” The Sunday Times 26 Nov 06.  
(15) “Why The West Must Stand Up To Putin’s Thugs: Oleg Gordievsky Reports 
On The Fears Of Russian Exiles,” The Daily Telegraph, 21 Nov 06.  
(16) “Russian Intelligence Denies Litvinenko Link,” The Guardian, 22 Nov 06 via 
Lexis Nexis.  
(17) “Defense Minister Rules Out Secret Services Behind Ex-Spy Death,” ITAR-
TASS, 28 Nov 06 via Lexis Nexis. 
(18) “‘Remember Trotsky!’ Then Litvinenko Stared At The Ground: Neil Barnett 
Recalls His Encounter With The Poisoned Spy Who Has Had The Bearing Of A 
Marked Man For Years,” The Spectator, 25 Nov 06 via Lexis Nexis.  
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(19) “Trained Killers Of The Old School,” The Sunday Times, 2 Dec 06 via 
www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2087-2484254,00.html.  
(20) “Russian Security Service Ex-Staffer Quizzed In Politkovskaya Murder 
Case,” Ekho Moskvy Radio Moscow in Russian, 15 Nov 06; BBC Monitoring via 
Lexis Nexis.  
(21) “Putin Wanted Blair To Gag Poisoned Spy,” The Sunday Times, 3 Dec 06 
via www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2087-2484059,00.html  
(22) “Former Spy Claims KGB Successor Agency Set Up Death Squad To Target 
Litvinenko,” Associated Press, 1 Dec 06 via Lexis Nexis.  
(23) See The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XIII, Number 3 (19 Oct 06).   
(24) “Politkovskaya Murder Suspect Denies Guilt,” The Moscow Times, 13 Nov 
06 via Lexis Nexis.  
(25) Ibid. 
(26) Ibid. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces (Internal) 
By Monty Perry 
 
Oh, what a tangled web...sanctions update  
Significant changes have taken place in the weeks since my last article about 
sanctions that had been levied against the Sukhoi aircraft manufacturer and the 
Russian export agency Rosoboronexport.  Russian-US relations, which recently 
have been increasingly strained, curiously have taken an ever-so slight turn.  
These changes are illustrative examples that international relations occasionally 
can be reduced to a situation of "you scratch my back, and I’ll scratch yours."  
The issues requiring attention recently have been the trade sanctions mentioned 
above; disagreements regarding the appropriate response to Iran’s nuclear 
ambitions; and resistance to Russia’s admittance to the World Trade 
Organization.  
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Until last week, the veto-wielding nations of the UN Security Council had been at 
a virtual standstill on the Iranian issue.  “The major powers have been debating a 
draft resolution drawn up by Britain, France and Germany that would impose 
limited sanctions on Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile sectors for Tehran’s 
failure to comply with an earlier UN resolution on halting enrichment.” (1)  The 
Russians, and to a lesser extent, the Chinese, who are both key trading partners 
with Iran, treated the draft as too harsh.  On the other hand, the US didn’t see the 
proposal as firm enough.  Something was needed to break the nearly month-long 
logjam.  On Monday, 21 November, following “bilateral talks [between Presidents 
Bush and Putin] on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
summit in Hanoi,” an announcement was made that sanctions against Sukhoi 
would be lifted. (2)  State Department spokesman Tom Casey told a press 
conference that “the sanctions, imposed on 28 July [for a pre-determined two 
year duration], were lifted in light of 'additional information' provided by the 
company and the Russian government” which showed Sukhoi had not broken the 
law after all. (3)  In prompt fashion, on 1 December, “Interfax news quoted 
Russian Foreign Minster Sergei Lavrov as saying that Russia is ready to back 
sanctions against Iran.” (4) (It remains to be seen how Russia interprets the term 
sanctions.) Bingo…logjam broken!  One could argue that the connection between 
these two issues is tenuous.  However, Russian United Nations Ambassador 
Vitali Churkin clarified Russia's view on these two issues. According to a 20 
October Associated Press, “Churkin made it unambiguously clear that until the 
United States lifts the sanctions it has imposed against Russian companies, 
Moscow will not cooperate on the Iran resolutions.” (5)  
 
Regarding WTO accession:  The United States and Russia have successfully 
completed bilateral talks, clearing the way for membership in the near future.  
The primary stumbling block was cleared when Russia changed its previous 
position and “agreed to shut down Allofmp3.com and other music sites based in 
that country that the US government says are offering downloads illegally.” (6)  
According to a press release issued on 19 November by the US Trade 
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Representative, “Russia will investigate and prosecute companies that illegally 
distribute copyright works on the internet.” (7)  Even though Allofmp3.com is still 
up and running and their corporate legal teams are fighting the issue, Russia’s 
stated willingness to crack down has scratched what had been a 13 year itch of 
grueling negotiations.  While consensus must still be reached by the multilateral 
working party, “Arkady Dvorkovich, head of the Kremlin’s economic staff, said 
Russia could wrap up a final entry deal within months.” (8) 
 
Arms sales update 
Russia’s renewed status in world arms sales has not come without some 
challenges. In one significant deal, Russia agreed to supply China with RD-93 
aircraft engines for use in their JF-17 fighter project.  However, this has become 
significantly problematic since Beijing also signed an agreement to supply 
Pakistan with 150 of these fighters in a deal worth an estimated $2.3B. (9)  The 
problem stems from Russia’s current policy against exporting arms to Pakistan.  
Consideration has been underway for the last 6 months toward changing this 
policy.  But, such a shift would be sure to upset another of Russia’s key trading 
partners and Pakistan’s sworn enemy…India.   
             
Rosoboronexport seems stuck between a rock and a hard place.  One way or 
another, they stand to lose billions.  In the event Russia stands firm behind their 
current policy, not only will they lose the profits on the sale of the engines, but 
they also will risk contracts currently being negotiated with China for fighters (Su-
33), amphibious aircraft (Be-200 ASW), helicopters (Ka-29/31), and troop 
transport hovercraft valued in excess of $3.3B. (10)  On the other hand, the 
impact of accepting Pakistan as a trading partner will be costly, as well.  
“Russia’s arms sales to India amount to over $1.5 billion a year.  Moreover, the 
MiG Corporation is [currently] competing in India’s tender for 126 [MiG-35] fighter 
jets, worth a total of $6.5 billion.” (11)   
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China, expected by Pakistan to deliver the jets, recently has been exerting 
increased pressure on Russia to make a decision.  “In his Independence Day 
speech…President Musharraf announced the JF-17s would be flying in Pakistani 
skies by March 2007.” (12)   This pressure and the resultant loss of future arms 
profits well may have contributed to Russia’s recent willingness to float Indonesia 
a $1B arms export credit.  Indonesia plans to use the credit to diversify its military 
hardware inventory and recover from years of inactivity resulting from a 15 year 
arms embargo lifted by the United States just this year.  The embargo, 
established 12 November, 1991 following the Santa Cruz cemetery massacre in 
East Timor, caused much of Indonesia’s US-supplied equipment to become 
either inoperative or outdated. (13)  Indonesian Defense Minister Juwono 
Sudarsono said the new purchase will consist of “five new cargo helicopters [Mi-
17], four combat helicopters [Mi-35], two submarines [Kilo-class] and six fighter 
jets [Su-27/Su-30].” (14) 
             
The potential loss of arms trade with either China or India also may have played 
a part in Russia’s decision to go ahead with the sale of Tor-M1 missiles to Iran, 
despite strong objection from the US and Europe.  Russian news agencies, citing 
an unnamed, high-ranking industry source, have reported that “deliveries of the 
Tor-M1 have begun.  The first systems have already been delivered to Tehran.” 
(15)  Despite defending the sale earlier as legitimate because the missiles are 
supposedly defensive in nature, Rosoboronexport representative Nikolai 
Dimidyuk has denied that any deliveries have taken place. (16)   
             
Russian business choices in arms trades lately raise doubt about a cohesive 
foreign policy.  When you look at a list ranging from Algeria to Venezuela, 
including China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Pakistan, etc., it’s no wonder that political 
relationships are beginning to pose problems for Russia’s entrepreneurial ways.  
The decision Russia makes regarding the export of its jet engines to Pakistan 
likely will be a telling sign of its future in the gunrunning business. 
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Russian Federation: Armed Forces (External) 
By Daniel DeBree 
 
Cold War II? 
The NATO summit was held last month in Riga, marking the first time this event 
ever had been conducted in a former Soviet republic.  Russian-NATO relations 
were very much on the minds of the participants, with Secretary-General Jaap de 
Hoop Scheffer stating that the relationship had not yet reached its full potential 
and that it was “one more important step to creating a truly united Europe.” (1) 
Even with these optimistic words, the location of this summit is disputed by the 
Russian leadership as a steady eastward expansion of the NATO inkblot.  
Although Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov refrained from portraying this year’s 
choice of location as a “provocation,” he described the relationship between the 
alliance and the Russian Federation as “far from harmonious.”  (2) Some 
Russian analysts go so far as to depict the current state of affairs as an indication 
that the West and Russia are in the nascent stages of a new Cold War. (3) 
 
Among the many issues that separate the two camps, the one highlighted by 
Russia is the continued eastern expansion of NATO.  Over the past seven years, 
NATO has admitted ten new members, all of them East European countries, 
mostly former Warsaw Pact members. (4) NATO is now considering three more 
countries for membership, Croatia, Albania, and Macedonia, while several former 
republics of the USSR, Georgia, and Moldova, remain at an initial stage of 
consideration for membership, and Ukraine now appears to be reluctant to be 
considered.  
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NATO’s role in the world has changed dramatically since the fall of the Soviet 
Union.  Originally designed as a collective defense to the perceived Soviet threat, 
it has now evolved into an organization that is willing to conduct “out of area” 
military operations.  Notably, NATO’s first true military operation was conducted 
in 1999 against Serbia, which had very strong ethnic, cultural, and historic ties 
with Russia. 
 
Russia questions NATO's intentions, recalling that is was told by the first Bush 
administration that “NATO would not expand one inch to the east” in 1992. 
Ivanov has stated that “we were completely deceived” on this issue. (5)  
 
Russia claims that NATO has reneged not only on the US promise to forego 
expansion to the east, but also to limit the establishment of military infrastructure 
in the new NATO members once they were accepted into the organization. 
Russia frequently cites Georgia’s conflict with South Ossetian and Abkhaz 
separatists as reasons for disqualification from NATO membership and blames 
NATO for encouraging Georgia to take action in these conflicts by simply 
“increasing dialogue” with Georgia over membership.  (6) 
 
In the words of the Commander in Chief of the Russian Air Force, General 
Vladimir Mikhailov, the increasing trend of “reaching objectives by use of military 
force” is reason alone to be wary of a strong military neighbor. In their view, 
Russia claims that NATO lost its raison d’être with the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, and Moscow much prefers that political issues be resolved through 
organizations with less military presence and more consensus-based decision-
making, such as the UN. (7) 
 
Although NATO expansion remains a source of contention with Russia, there is 
another issue looming on the horizon that could quickly overshadow it: the 
deployment of US/NATO missile defense systems in Eastern Europe.  The US 
intends to deploy a strategic missile defense system in Poland, Czech Republic, 
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Romania, and Bulgaria, to defend against ballistic missiles from Iran or other 
“rogue states” in the Middle East.  NATO obviously is involved in this decision, as 
the umbrella also will serve to shield Europe from the same threat.  Russia, for its 
part, claims that intercontinental missiles from Iran (which it does not yet 
possess) will not fly over Poland or the Czech Republic on their journey toward 
targets in the US, and contends that this system is designed to counter Russian 
missiles. (8)  Russia asserts that this situation would practically negate the 
Russian nuclear missile deterrent and thus cause the redeployment of those 
assets to positions farther east, where the missiles could not be countered in 
their most vulnerable boost phase.  In fact, Russia already has made some 
movement of military hardware in response to this proposed missile defense 
shield, by deploying anti-aircraft missile systems to Belarus. (9)   Additionally, 
NATO's ambiguity on the number of nuclear weapons that it still has in Europe 
supposedly results in a serious threat to Russian defense planning. 
 
So, does this situation constitute a full-fledged Cold War between the West and 
Russia, as experienced in the latter half of the 20th century?  Some analysts 
argue that the Cold War never has ended. Only Russia’s economic resurgence 
with petrodollars, it is claimed, has provided the wherewithal to stand up to a 
post-Cold War US with an allegedly “winner take all” attitude. (10) 
 
The picture is not that bleak, however.  There are numerous indicators in NATO, 
US, and Russian cooperation that point to a relationship, which, while not always 
harmonious, is at least not hostile.  Russia now enjoys an essentially equal vote 
with other NATO members as part of its position on the NATO-Russia Council 
(NRC).  Unlike the former “19+1” arrangement under the Permanent Joint 
Council, whereby Russia conferred with NATO members only after they had met 
together to form a consolidated front, the NRC arrangement has much more 
transparency.  In fact, Ivanov has stated that there is no reason to pursue NATO 
membership for Russia, since it has as much authority as it needs with the 
current arrangement. (11)  Indeed, Defense Minister Ivanov attends every NATO 
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summit and the leaders of the two organizations meet annually.  This relationship 
was further solidified in 2004, when both NATO and Russia established 
permanent military liaison offices in Moscow and Mons, Belgium respectively. 
 
The joint NATO-Russian submarine in distress rescue program is another 
example of continued cooperation, with a successful rescue of an AS-28 min-
submarine crew in 2005. (12)  Russia also participates in a number of substantial 
NATO exercises, although this is a tenuous link, as the cancellation of Torgau 
2006 exercises aptly demonstrated. The pilot project for Russian training of 
Afghan anti-terrorist forces is another example that points to a less than icy East-
West relationship. And finally, NATO has a regular column in Krasnaya Zvezda 
(Red Star), the official newspaper of the Russian Armed Forces, a development 
that would have been inconceivable 20 years ago. (13) 
 
In a final assessment, NATO and Russia are not in the midst of a new Cold War, 
but neither is the relationship between them as good as it was in the late 1990s.  
Although they are not adversarial, neither are they true partners. 
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Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Marisa Payne 
 
To CIS or Not to CIS 
The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the organization set up in 
December 1991 that connects most of the countries of the former Soviet Union, 
may be on its last legs. Although its imminent passing has been lingering for at 
least a year, this year’s summit held on November 27-28 in Minsk, Belarus, 
seems to have made official that the CIS, if not declared completely dead, will 
continue on only as a very different entity. 
 
Since its inception, the CIS has experienced a decline in popularity among its 
member countries. After its creation by the three founding members (Belarus, 
Russia, and Ukraine), it stabilized for a time at 12 member states (with the 
addition of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan); the organization now officially 
consists of 11 countries (Turkmenistan opted out of full membership in favor of 
“associate” membership in August 2005). Moreover, Western-led organizations 
like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) 
from time to time have not discouraged certain CIS countries (Georgia, Ukraine 
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and Moldova) to hope for eventual membership, which would weaken their ties to 
the CIS. 
 
The CIS began with a dual and somewhat contradictory purpose – to hasten the 
disintegration of the USSR, while simultaneously integrating the newly 
independent countries into a post-Soviet working partnership. 
 
Aleksandr Dugin, the head of the Center for Geopolitical Studies, predicts that 
the CIS cannot continue as it exists today for long: “I am deeply convinced that 
we are approaching a critical point, where these two aspects – integrational and 
disintegrational – can no longer coexist inside the same organization, the 
CIS…[W]e are standing on the threshold of the end of the CIS. But it is not a fact 
that this will be the end of all post-Soviet structures. I suppose that the 
integrational direction in post-CIS has a future.” (1) 
 
Putin remained more optimistic about the CIS, although he, too, admitted reform 
is necessary: “We [CIS members] agreed that the organization is needed but that 
its potential has not yet been fully realized. There is a need for this organization 
and it has good development prospect.” (2) He continued, “At the same time, 
however, significant changes have taken place over recent years in the post-
Soviet area and the organization must adapt to today’s conditions.” (3) 
 
Putin did not elaborate on what those “significant changes” entailed, but some of 
the most significant changes were the color revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and 
Kyrgyzstan, as well as Russia’s increasing neo-imperialist identity. 
 
Since the break-up of the USSR, Russia has struggled with its identity. The 
question that remains most salient to its neighbors, as well as the rest of the 
world: Will the end of the Cold War coax Russia into becoming a Western-style 
democracy or will Russia revert to its autocratic roots? In the early-to-mid-
nineties, the answer varied depending on when and to whom the question was 
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posed. Using comments on NATO as a reflection of openness to the West, 
Russia increasingly has voiced strong opinions on membership. When Yeltsin 
first came to power in 1991, his stance on NATO could be considered lukewarm. 
On December 20, 1991, Yeltsin sent NATO a message that stated: “Today we 
are raising a question of Russia’s membership in NATO, but we are prepared to 
regard this as a long-term objective.” (4) Just days later (and after NATO failed to 
respond to Yeltsin’s letter), the Kremlin revised its statement claiming an error in 
translation. Moscow maintained that the statement was supposed to read: “today 
we are not raising a question of Russia’s membership in NATO….” (5) By 1996, 
after turbulent elections that landed nationalist and neo-communist groups in the 
parliament, the Kremlin’s statements on NATO had become consistently cool. 
Russia began to portray NATO as a real threat, as it expanded to include former 
Warsaw-pact countries. Many Russian politicians began to tout a neo-imperial 
line of thought: If Russia does not remain strong among the CIS states, NATO 
may take its place. 
 
In what may be viewed as cruel irony to Russian neo-imperialists, while the CIS 
summit trudged along in Minsk, the NATO summit took place simultaneously only 
hundreds of miles away in Riga, Latvia. However, despite NATO members 
expressing their individual (if vague) support to include Georgia and Ukraine as 
members, Russian neo-imperialists could relax knowing that the leaders of 
Georgia and Ukraine traveled to Minsk instead of Riga. 
 
Putin himself nearly made the trip to Riga during the NATO summit, in order to 
celebrate French President Jacque Chirac’s 74th birthday. The proposition 
turned into a large and tangled diplomatic mess as Putin first agreed, then 
declined to attend the dinner, citing a conflict of schedule. (6) If Putin had 
attended the dinner, not only would he have been the first Russian leader to set 
foot in a Baltic state since the fall of the USSR, but his attendance would have 
caused greater strain between Russia, the United States and Latvia. Although 
most comments were off the record, Latvian and US officials expressed their 
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disapproval, since Putin’s attendance would have violated the summit’s no-guest 
policy (the guest list was to include only the 26 NATO invitees). (7) 
 
The fact that Putin’s dinner invitation caused so much diplomatic consternation is 
indicative of Western fears of Russia’s neo-imperialist regime. Although Georgia 
and Ukraine are potential NATO candidates, it was Russia that became the 
center of attention in Riga. 
 
Meanwhile, NATO dialogue about potential membership for Georgia and Ukraine 
has remained just that–dialogue. NATO has made clear that the process will be 
slow, if indeed, it occurs at all. 
 
Polish President Lech Kaczynski, who strongly supports including Georgia in 
NATO, blamed Western fears of Russia's increased response to the move for 
NATO’s hesitation: “Georgia is treated with a lot of sympathy, but we also have a 
group of politicians who are, let’s say, cautious…This caution results…from the 
reactions of its [Georgia’s] powerful neighbor.” (8) 
 
It is hard not to fear what Russia may do to assure its influence in the face of 
putative NATO encroachment in the CIS. In recent months, and increasingly so 
after Georgia charged five Russians with espionage, the Kremlin has all but cut 
off Georgia completely– politically by closing its embassy; economically by 
implementing bans on Georgian wine and mineral water and on remittances from 
Georgians working in Russia; and, physically by closing down border crossings. 
 
Georgia is not the only state in the CIS to complain of Russian interference. Just 
about every state in the CIS has objected to at least some Russian foreign policy 
decisions in the CIS. Now, even Russia’s closest ally in the CIS, Belarus, has 
filed a complaint. 
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On November 7, Gazprom, Russia’s state-owned natural gas monopoly, 
announced that it would no longer subsidize energy prices for CIS states. (9) In 
response, Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka told Putin during a 
private meeting that he is considering pursuing stronger bilateral relations with 
Ukraine to facilitate more affordable gas prices. (10) 
 
With little benefit from Russia in the form of energy breaks, the other countries 
that make up the CIS have few incentives to remain in the CIS. Likewise, there 
does not seem to be any real economic benefit for Russia. Russia does, 
however, have a psychological interest in keeping the CIS alive. Being the 
biggest and richest nation in the CIS, Russia would continue to remain the most 
powerful member of the group.  
 
Let them drink Moldovan Wine…As long as Russia has WTO prospects 
Russia's decision to life the ban on Moldovan wine was another big story that 
developed at the CIS summit. 
 
The timing of Russia's decision suggests that lifting the ban was less the result of 
a softening on foreign relations with Moldova than an element of WTO 
negotiation. Just over a week earlier, Putin met with his US counterpart on the 
sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit. After 12 
years of negotiations, the United States and Russia finally reached a bilateral 
agreement that would allow Russia to become a member of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). (11) 
 
While many consider the pact with the US to have been Russia’s biggest hurdle, 
other states have threatened to stand in the Kremlin’s way. One of them was 
Moldova, until Putin agreed to lift the ban on Moldovan wines and meats. 
 
In a press statement issued after Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin and Putin 
met in bilateral talks during the CIS summit, Putin announced: “Regarding 
 28 
agricultural produce, specialists in both countries, Moldovan and Russian 
experts, have carried out a great amount of work together on quality controls and 
certifying produce. We have agreed to resume imports of meat and wine from 
Moldova.” (12) 
 
Yet, considering Russia’s decision to lift the ban as well as Moldova’s prior 
threats to block Russia’s entry into the WTO because of the ban, it seems less 
likely that Russia imposed the ban last March because of health reasons. 
Instead, it seems more likely that Russia used it as a political lever, once again 
exhibiting neo-imperialistic tendencies in its neighborhood. 
 
Russia, however, has still not made any indication that it would lift the ban on 
Georgian agricultural imports. 
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Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Creelea Henderson 
 
An acronym imbroglio: CIS vs. NATO 
If the twelve heads of state representing members of the CIS cannot agree on 
the relevance of their alliance, can the rest of the world safely assume that the 
Commonwealth of Independent States has slipped into obsolescence? The 
answer hinges upon the special relationship various member states have with 
Moscow, and in what estimation members hold that understanding. The 
organization, designed to buffer the effects of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 
to this point has secured special privileges, amounting to economic subsidies, for 
neighboring countries that agree to toe Moscow’s line. As neighbors stray in their 
dependency, however, Moscow has seen fit to withdraw its favors, most 
significantly in the form of discounted rates for natural gas supplies, causing a 
general dispersal of loyalties toward alliances which have more international 
prestige, more leverage or more opportunity for nascent democracies with rapidly 
developing economies to flourish. (1) 
 
Toward the end of November 2006, two winter summits were held 
simultaneously in two cities of northeastern Europe—while NATO leaders 
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gathered in Riga, heads of eleven of the twelve countries belonging to the CIS 
convened in Minsk. 
 
The choice of November 28 as the date of the CIS summit raised some 
eyebrows and pursed the lips of some analysts, who had been expecting the 
summit to take place as part of a fifteen year anniversary gala on December 7, 
the date that the Commonwealth was founded in 1991. Instead, CIS organizers 
deliberately and, perhaps, perversely, set the summit date as a bold 
contraposition to their NATO rivals. 
 
If failure is too harsh an appraisal of the gathering which took place on November 
28 in Minsk, it is, by any measure, an accurate reflection of the crisis threatening 
the fundamental causa causans of this loose bond between former Soviet states, 
whose leaders are unable or unwilling to address the cardinal issue on the 
summit’s agenda—modernizing the CIS to make it more relevant. “These 
decisions are put off from meeting to meeting, and now they have been put off 
again,” complained CIS chairman and Kazakh president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, 
on the day following the summit’s conclusion. (2) 
 
His exasperation is shared fully by fellow members of the CIS. Over the summit’s 
short course, Minsk proved to be a showcase for signs of irrelevance: the central 
event lasted just over three hours; the closing press conference was boycotted 
by the Russian press corps, after it was learned that three of their number were 
denied access to the summit by Belarusian authorities; Saparmurat Niyazov, the 
eccentric president of Turkmenistan, chose not to attend, sending his prime 
minister in his stead. (3) Following a familiar CIS pattern, the states once again 
failed to agree on a crucial issue. This time it concerned the delimitation of 
contested borders running between members’ sovereign territories. (4) 
 
The summit’s most productive moments took place on the sidelines, in private 
talks between leaders. In the spare minutes between official proceedings, 
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Moldova’s President Voronin came to an understanding with Russian President 
Putin in which the latter agreed to lift the ban on Moldovan wine and meat in 
exchange for Moldova’s support for Russia’s accession to the WTO; (5) 
Armenian President Robert Kocharyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev 
made use of their time in Minsk to hold a post-summit tête à tête to discuss the 
resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict; (6) and perhaps the most intriguing 
outcome from the summit was a brief meeting between President Putin and 
Georgian President Saakashvili that underscored the total impasse in the two 
countries’ relations. According to Kommersant, the two leaders met, exchanged 
three rounds of mutual reproach, and parted on the same acrimonious terms. “It 
is time for us, Georgians, to understand that it won’t have any decisive 
importance for us what Russia will think, say or do in respect to Georgia,” 
Saakashvili said. (7) Clearly, Georgia chose not to follow the Moldovan model to 
curry Moscow’s favor. 
 
Two days later in London, President Saakashvili told the Financial Times that he 
and President Putin had met in the wings of the summit in Minsk for half an hour 
in “useful” dialogue. “We insisted on it. Georgian-Russian relations dominated the 
summit. It is a test case and everybody else is watching,” he was quoted as 
saying. (8) Georgia clearly is keen to take the initiative, or to be seen as taking 
the initiative, in Georgian-Russian relations. President Saakashvili was rewarded 
for his optimistic rhetoric by a boon from President Bush. In a speech before the 
University of Latvia as part of the NATO summit, the American President 
promised to support Georgia’s bid to join NATO, “as it continues on the path to 
reform, we will continue to support Georgia's desire to become a NATO ally.” (9) 
NATO members affirmed Bush’s stance in a summit declaration that welcomed 
the "Intensified Dialogue" that has been initiated as an initial step toward 
Georgia’s eventual full membership. (10) That "Dialogue," however, constitutes, 
at best, a very vague, embryonic move that may, or may not, lead to actual 
candidacy in the foreseeable future. 
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In Georgia, optimistically or hopefully, there has been talk of quitting the CIS in 
anticipation of NATO membership in 2008. In January of this year, Georgia 
announced its withdrawal from the CIS Council of Defense Ministers on the 
grounds that “Georgia has taken a course to join NATO and it cannot be part of 
two military structures simultaneously,” according to a statement posted on the 
Georgian government website. (11) While it is true that the two organizations are 
not strictly parallel institutions–NATO being a security alliance and the CIS 
fulfilling a much more diffuse set of functions that includes coordinating powers in 
the realm of trade, finance and lawmaking, as well as security–Russia’s abiding 
mistrust of the western security alliance promotes the perception of the two as 
rivals locked in a zero sum contest. 
 
Earlier in the year, Moscow portrayed accession to NATO by states belonging to 
the CIS as nothing less than a casusbelli. The logic ran that the CIS serves as a 
framework to delimit Moscow’s sphere of influence on the geopolitical landscape, 
and the overtures to join NATO on the part of Georgia and (at that time) Ukraine 
were described in Moscow as acts of provocation on the part of client states. 
There are recent signs, however, that Moscow has come to recognize that these 
states are drifting away on independent courses, and is moving to moderate its 
strident, anti-NATO rhetoric. Following the motions of the Riga summit that 
seemed not to discourage Georgia and Ukraine from pursuing membership, 
Russian Defense Minister Ivanov admitted that Russia is unable to influence the 
process of NATO enlargement and issued a statement to the effect that every 
country is free to decide which bloc to join. “We can take a critical posture and 
say we disapprove of this or that country’s admission to NATO, but I believe it 
would be very wrong.” (12) 
 
If NATO is no longer Moscow’s main antagonist, then the role of the CIS on the 
international stage is suddenly unclear and in need of sober reevaluation by its 
members. Organizers of the CIS summit in Minsk seized upon the symbolic 
gesture of a counter-summit as a means of doing what CIS members were 
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unable to do in the course of the event—demonstrate vis-à-vis NATO that the 
CIS is still relevant as a geopolitical force. 
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Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
Pie in the sky?  Kyrgyzstan's new constitution to take effect in 2010 
On 9 November, Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiev signed into law a new 
constitution, which transfers a number of presidential powers to the Jogorku 
Kengesh (Kyrgyzstan’s parliament), as well as increasing the number of 
parliamentary seats from 75 to 90 (of these 90, half are to be elected on party 
slates, based on a system of proportional representation).  Under the new 
constitution, the majority party in parliament will name the country’s prime 
minister; (1) Kyrgyzstan’s national security agency will report to the government, 
rather than to the president; (2) and the Jogorku Kengesh will appoint the heads 
of the national bank and central election commission. (3)  The new constitution is 
the result of months of protests and demonstrations by Kyrgyz opposition groups, 
the most recent of which lasted from 2-9 November, dispersing only after 
adoption of the new constitution was announced. (4)  Kyrgyz opposition parties 
have been calling for the constitution to be reformed in favor of a parliamentary 
system of government since President Bakiev and Prime Minister Feliks Kulov 
first took power in 2005,  and it is a significant achievement that both sides finally 
were able to come to agreement.  However, the new constitution is not 
scheduled to take effect until 2010, when the next presidential and parliamentary 
elections are due to take place, has left many opposition activists dissatisfied and 
may well result in further political and social turmoil.  In fact, although Bishkek is 
no longer the site of daily anti-government protests, the political crisis is far from 
settled: the president’s supporters are pressing him to dissolve parliament; the 
prime minister and prosecutor general are considering criminal charges against a 
number of prominent For Reforms movement activists; and many opposition 
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leaders have renewed their calls for Prime Minister Kulov’s resignation.  The fact 
that constitutional changes will not go into effect for another two years makes 
Kyrgyzstan’s political situation even more uncertain—as President Bakiev’s 
powers remaining unchecked for now, will he simply seek to preserve the status 
quo until 2010, and if so, will the opposition tolerate his inaction? 
 
The process by which the new constitution was adopted has created new 
tensions and generated new ammunition for opposition and government 
supporters to fire at each other, as they continue their power struggle.  The first 
few days of the opposition demonstrations, in particular, witnessed very 
aggressive tactics on behalf of the government to discredit its opponents and 
stymie their efforts for reform.  Both President Bakiev and Prime Minister Kulov 
declared that the first draft of the new constitution, which was produced by a 
small Constituent Assembly of MPs on 6 November, was illegitimate and that the 
MPs had acted illegally, in an attempt to seize power.  The final draft of the 
constitution was a compromise version based on the Constituent Assembly’s 
document and President Bakiev’s own draft, which was then approved by a 
parliamentary majority and signed by the president on 9 November. (5)  In order 
to guarantee the new constitution’s legitimacy on a legal basis, the Jogorku 
Kengesh first amended its rules of procedure, before voting on it. (6)  However, 
although President Bakiev eventually accepted the revised document, initially he 
and Prime Minister Kulov attempted to derail the entire process by accusing a 
group of the For Reforms movement’s leaders of planning a coup against the 
government.  A conversation between the movement’s leaders at MP Omurbek 
Tekebaev’s office, (7) during which they allegedly discussed the forcible takeover 
of “important state objects” was secretly recorded (8) and released to the public 
on 3 November, along with a report on President Bakiev and Prime Minister 
Kulov’s comments to the Jogorku Kengesh earlier that day, when they presented 
the recording to the MPs. (9)   Mr. Tekebaev responded to the accusations by 
stating that although most of the recording did correspond to a discussion he and 
his colleagues had held while planning the opposition demonstrations, certain 
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words (“seizure [of power], murder, marauding”) had been added to the text and 
that the recording had been obtained illegally, in any case. (10)  The audio 
recording has been handed over to the Prosecutor General’s office and a 
criminal investigation has been launched into the For Reforms leaders’ activities, 
but it is not yet clear how far the matter will be pursued. 
 
Now that President Bakiev has approved the new constitution and the opposition 
demonstrations have ceased, Prime Minister Kulov seems to have tempered his 
tactics somewhat and is no longer pursuing his critics so aggressively.  He 
remains very critical of the constitutional reform process, however, stating “I am 
very much worried about the simplified procedure for adoption and introduction of 
changes to the new constitution. One can be making changes endlessly in this 
way and this creates a dangerous precedent” in a 10 November meeting with the 
head of the OSCE mission in Bishkek.  PM Kulov also expressed the opinion that 
the new constitution does not sufficiently delineate the division of power between 
parliament and the executive branch, leaving certain issues open to contention, 
particularly the procedure for appointing administration heads. (11)  In the wake 
of Kulov's refusal to support constitutional reform, his criticism of the Jogorku 
Kengesh deputies for taking matters into their own hands and his recent smear 
tactics against them, opposition leaders once more are calling for his resignation 
and many have openly accused him of obstructing Kyrgyzstan’s democratic 
development.  
 
President Bakiev’s supporters, for their part, have been calling on the president 
to dismiss parliament on the grounds that the MPs tried to stage a coup d’état by 
taking matters into their own hands and convening a Constituent Assembly. (12)  
During a pro-Bakiev demonstration in Jalalabad (President Bakiev was born in 
Kyrgyzstan’s southern Jalalabad Province and was governor there from 1995-
1997) (13), the president’s supporters passed a resolution demanding that the 
Jogorku Kengesh be dissolved, that the text of the new constitution be published 
and subjected to national approval, and that Kyrgyz authorities “call politicians to 
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account for an attempted coup d'état.” (14)  Opposition leaders themselves have 
been speculating publicly that the president intends to dismiss the parliament and 
call for new elections before the end of the year.  Parliament speaker and 
opposition leader Omurbek Tekebaev claimed to have knowledge that the 
Bakiev-Kulov administration was planning to hold a national referendum on 
whether or not to dissolve the parliament, based on the premise that the new 
constitution had been adopted illegally.  President Bakiev allegedly summoned 
Central Election Commission chairman Tuygunaly Abdraimov to his office to 
discuss the plan, but when Mr. Abdraimov was unable to provide legal 
substantiation for the government’s accusations against the Jogorku Kengesh 
deputies, the plan was scuttled. (15) 
 
The fact that President Bakiev lately has confined himself to taking only such 
action against the opposition as is sanctioned by Kyrgyzstan’s laws is a positive 
sign and hopefully will help him maintain a relatively civil relationship with his 
critics, which in turn could help protect the country from further violent upheaval.  
Unfortunately, the President has been using those legal tactics at his disposal to 
punish a number of opposition supporters for their actions against his 
administration.  One of the first victims was the governor of Chuy Province 
(located in northern Kyrgyzstan), Turgunbek Kulmurzaev, who came to Bishkek 
to support the opposition’s demands for constitutional reform and made a public 
appearance at one of the demonstrations, in which he called for President 
Bakiev’s resignation. (16)  Mr. Kulmurzaev was fired on 7 November. (17)  Since 
then, other opposition supporters, as well as their family members, have been 
threatened with arrest, most recently the wife of businessman and For Reforms 
activist Omurbek Abdrakhmanov, Beyish Aidikeeva, whom the Financial Police 
Service attempted to arrest for tax evasion on 1 December. (18) 
 
These types of tactics risk undermining the delicate truce that President Bakiev 
was able to forge with the opposition leaders by working out a compromise 
version of a new constitution that is reported to reflect both his goals and those of 
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the opposition leaders who sit in the Jogorku Kengesh.  If the President is wise, 
he will allow his collaboration with the MPs on a new constitution to become the 
first step in a process of government-wide reform, a reform for which many in 
Kyrgyzstan have been struggling since before the 2005 “Tulip Revolution.” 
Contrary to Prime Minister Kulov’s arguments, the process by which 
constitutional reform finally was achieved was anything but hasty.  Parliament 
began lobbying for constitutional change in 2005, following President Akaev’s 
ouster, and it is President Bakiev who has been dragging his feet on the matter, 
making one empty promise after another and postponing the deadline for 
beginning the discussion on reform multiple times.  The president’s recent 
actions against his critics smack of personal vendettas and constitute a sign that 
he intends to continue exploiting his executive powers to benefit himself and his 
close associates, à la Akaev.  Unless the president accepts changes to his 
methods of governing today, his signature on the new constitution will remain 
merely a symbol of promised future change.  If, on the other hand, President 
Bakiev’s powers stay unchecked until 2010, he may be able to neutralize his 
opponents, win a second term in office and subsequently repeal the 
constitutional changes.  Another, perhaps even more ominous scenario, is that 
his opponents will become so frustrated with the lack of political reform that they 
will attempt to bring about another regime change, which could plunge the 
country into chaos, if not outright civil war.  9 November was a historic day, 
marking not only the adoption of a new Kyrgyz constitution, but a successful, 
collaborative effort between the president and the parliament to reform their 
government – now the question is whether 9 November marks only the beginning 
of this process or the end. 
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Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
Yanukovych Goes to Washington  
On 3 December, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych arrived in Washington DC for 
a short visit, giving US officials “a chance to get to know him,” according to one 
analyst. (1)  In reality, they had the chance to get to know him all over again. 
 
Many Washington officials, of course, first became familiar with Yanukovych in 
2004, when he served as President Leonid Kuchma’s prime minister.  Then, he 
was criticized widely for complicity in a semi-authoritarian administration that 
muzzled the press, harassed political opposition leaders and profited hugely, and 
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perhaps illegally, from its connection with transnational energy and metallurgical 
corporations. He was accused of participating in the fraud that marred the first 
two rounds of the 2004 presidential election, and was admonished in the West 
during that period for supporting the separatist calls of officials in Eastern 
Ukraine.  Viktor Yushchenko’s victory over Yanukovych in the final round of the 
presidential election was hailed as a victory for democracy over authoritarianism.  
 
How things have changed.  
 
In the parliamentary elections of 2006, largely thanks to the votes of Eastern 
Ukrainians, Yanukovych’s party received a plurality of votes.  After the parties 
allied with President Viktor Yushchenko were unable to unite in order to form a 
majority coalition, Yanukovych’s party joined with the Communists and Socialists 
to create the majority and return him to the prime minister’s seat. 
 
Since then, Yanukovych has been in a tense battle with Yushchenko for control 
in Ukraine—in particular over the direction of foreign policy.  Yushchenko has 
made no secret of his wish to see Ukraine become a member of the EU, while 
Yanukovych has made no secret of his wish to work closely with Russia. 
 
In Washington, the visit was held quietly.  “Low key” was the phrase used most 
often by officials who seemed to be going out of their way to side-step the 
infighting between Yushchenko and Yanukovych.  The prime minister’s meetings 
with Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice were 
held away from the media spotlight, and both US officials avoided public 
comment.  
 
On 5 December, Ukraine’s ICTV bemoaned the lack of concrete progress and 
the manner in which the visit was downplayed by US representatives.  “The visit 
of Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych to the USA is not going very smoothly,” the 
channel reported. “In particular, even Yanukovych's personal cameraman was 
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not allowed to attend the meeting (sic) between Yanukovych and Secretary of 
State Condoleezza Rice and Vice-President Dick Cheney. … The commentary 
regarding the meetings with Rice and Cheney also lacked details.”  (2) 
 
Nevertheless, Yanukovych claimed to be happy to be able to deliver his 
message.  “I said what I had to say,” he announced.  “I said that, really, Ukraine 
has taken the path of democratic change and this path is irreversible now, that 
there is significantly more freedom of speech and democracy in Ukraine now, 
that Ukraine is getting prepared to join the WTO, and that it starts global reforms 
in 2007.” (3) 
 
But former US Ambassador to Ukraine Steven Pifer said most questions from US 
officials to Yanukovych would involve his relations with President Yushchenko.  
"There are concerns in the administration about his earlier actions as prime 
minister,” Pifer told  Kommersant magazine, “but the U.S. has decided not to let 
them show, but to invite Yanukovich for a walk and see how serious the 
disagreement between him and Yushchenko is." (4) 
 
It is impossible to know with certainty whether the administration was reassured, 
but the lack of any concrete details or statements of support during the visit 
suggests that Yanukovych has a long way to go before he is embraced by the 
United States. 
 
Lutsenko Leaves to Return?  
On the morning of 1 December, Yuriy Lutsenko was dismissed from his post as 
interior minister by parliament.  On the afternoon of that same day, parliament 
also voted to remove Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk from his position.  
 
The political wrangling that preceded the vote over Lutsenko demonstrates the 
divisions that continue to plague the allies of President Viktor Yushchenko.  
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The vote on Lutsenko provided interesting fodder for conspiracy theorists.  When 
the Yanukovych government took office, the now former interior minister was 
nominated by Yushchenko to remain in the position he has held since the 
president took office.  He first balked at working with Yanukovych, but then 
relented, at the president’s insistence, he said.  
 
He has been under siege from the Yanukovych-led parliamentary majority almost 
since the day he assented to work in the new government.  Lutsenko was known 
to make very public accusations of corruption against members of parliament – 
and in particular members of Yanukovych’s Party of Regions.  Even though, 
during his tenure, not one parliamentarian was arrested for any crime, his 
frequent statements were an irritation. 
 
In response, the Party of Regions attempted to suggest that Lutsenko was 
corrupt.  A Kyiv court threw out these accusations – which dealt with improper 
use of Interior Ministry vehicles – and in fact, Lutsenko is believed by many to be 
one of the country’s most honest politicians. 
 
His dismissal occurred in stages.  On 30 November, in the first of two votes on 
the issue, parliament voted to ask the prime minister to dismiss the interior 
minister.  The vote tally showed an interesting vote breakdown.  The Socialist 
Party, a member of the Party of Regions-led majority split from their colleagues 
and voted against the dismissal.  This should have kept Lutsenko safe.  But 18 of 
125 members of The Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc (BYUT) – an ally of President 
Yushchenko – broke party discipline and voted for the dismissal.  These 18, plus 
two defectors from Yushchenko’s own Our Ukraine, allowed the dismissal vote to 
pass.  
 
Following the vote, during an angry, animated press conference, Tymoshenko 
lashed out at her own members, accusing them of making “personal 
arrangements with the members of Yanukovych’s team.”  Although she said the 
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interior minister “worked ineffectively and did not cope with his job,” she pledged 
to honor her obligations to the president and Our Ukraine by supporting 
Lutsenko.  (5) 
 
The public statements, combined undoubtedly with some private persuasion, 
pushed seven of the BYUT members back into line.  When Yanukovych decreed 
Lutsenko’s dismissal and sent it back to parliament for confirmation, the measure 
failed by three votes.  For the day, Lutsenko’s job had been saved.  
 
At that time, several politicians and journalists privately noted surprise that the 
Socialists had chosen to defend Lutsenko.  Although he had originally been a 
prominent Socialist member, Lutsenko resigned from the party when it joined the 
parliamentary coalition. Even more, Yanukovych reportedly had agreed to 
nominate a Socialist—Vasyl Tsushko—to replace him.    
 
The surprise was short-lived.  The next day, the Socialists voted for the 
resubmitted dismissal motion.  Thanks to this Socialist switch, despite 
Tymoshenko corralling all but five members in support of Lutsenko, the motion 
passed easily, with 248 out of 450 votes.  
 
So, why the switch on the part of the Socialists?  What was the point of 
supporting Lutsenko on 30 November but not 1 December?  Of course, it may be 
that the deal to replace Lutsenko with Tsushko had not been finalized.  But, on 
30 November, the Ukrainian media carried numerous stories about Tsushko’s 
impending nomination.  Could there have been another reason?  Some privately 
wonder whether the vote could have been intended to trap the Tymoshenko Bloc 
into being the “fall guy” for Lutsenko’s dismissal.  Tymoshenko largely blunted 
this by corralling enough members on the second vote to save Lutsenko's job.  
 
This theory became especially prominent when video from the parliament 
showed Tsushko talking and laughing with Our Ukraine members prior to the 
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vote, and when the head of President Yushchenko’s administration immediately 
called the dismissal “a normal process.”  Viktor Baloha then went on to praise 
Tsushko as a man who understood how “to maintain calm in society.”  (6) 
 
The next day, Lutsenko was named an advisor to the president, and he 
reportedly has been tapped to head a “new political project” – or party – that will 
support Yushchenko.   The president is aware that Our Ukraine’s popularity is 
low and falling (around 10% now depending on the poll), and he has stated 
repeatedly that he will support a “new project.”     
 
On 6 December, Yushchenko met Yulia Tymoshenko—where he chastised her 
for “destabilizing” the state by supporting the dismissal of Lutsenko.  According to 
his press secretary, “The President said last week’s vote by several deputies 
from Tymoshenko’s bloc to dismiss Interior Minister Lutsenko was one of such 
destabilizing moves.”  (7)  
 
It was an odd statement—given the fact that 120 out of 125 BYUT members 
voted against the final vote to dismiss, and two of the five who voted for the 
measure already have been expelled from the faction.   It is especially odd since 
four members of Our Ukraine disregarded the president and also voted to 
remove the interior minister.  They have not been expelled.  
 
However, it is not odd to mention this point if there is a plan to entrust the popular 
Lutsenko with building a new pro-presidential political party, and if that party will 
compete for the electorate of Tymoshenko’s Bloc.   
 
So, it would seem a battle between Tymoshenko and Lutsenko has been 
foreshadowed.  Is the best plan for Ukraine to continue to divide the pro-Western, 
reformist votes between two parties—in this case those led by Tymoshenko and 
Lutsenko?  Yushchenko seems to believe it is, and the new project appears to 
have begun. 
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